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INTRODUCTION 
Luis Beltran was a maintenance building technician at a nursing 
home in New Jersey.2  On March 24, 2020, he performed work in the 
room of a resident who soon after tested positive for COVID-19.3  
Luis began to feel ill, and the next week, his mother, who cared for his 
children while he worked, tested positive for COVID-19.4  Luis was 
instructed by his local health department to quarantine for two weeks, 
but his employer repeatedly insisted he return to work earlier.5  When 
he did not, he was fired.6  Luis sued, asserting his statutory right to 
two weeks of emergency paid sick leave under the novel Families 
First Coronavirus Response Act (FFCRA).7  His employer argued 
that it was entitled to exempt Luis from this leave because “health 
care providers” could be excluded under the statute.8  At the time of 
his termination, the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) erroneously 
defined “health care provider” to include people like Luis, who 
provided no health care but happened to work for a nursing home.9 
Luis was not alone in being excluded from emergency paid sick 
leave due to the DOL’s overly-broad emergency rule, which was 
promulgated, with Congress’s blessing, without ‘notice and comment’ 
rulemaking procedures.10  The temporary FFCRA, passed at the 
outset of the COVID-19 pandemic, provided some U.S. workers with 
two weeks of emergency paid sick leave to quarantine due to 
COVID-19 exposure or infection and expanded the Family Medical 
Leave Act to allow parents to take unpaid leave due to COVID-19-
related school closures.11  The federal government subsidized this 
leave with tax credits.12  Employers covered by the law could elect to 
use the “health care provider” and first responder exception to 
exclude their employees from this emergency paid sick leave.13  The 
DOL estimated that 9 million health care workers could be excluded 
 
 2. Beltran v. 2 Deer Park Drive Operations, LLC, No. 20-8454 (MAS) (LHG), 
2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37291, at *1–2 (D.N.J. Feb. 28, 2021). 
 3. Id. at *2. 
 4. Id. at *2–3. 
 5. Id. at *3–4. 
 6. Id. at *4. 
 7. See id. at *5. 
 8. Id. at *14–17. 
 9. Id. 
 10. See infra Section I.C.i. 
 11. See infra Section I.B.ii. 
 12. See Families First Coronavirus Response Act, Pub. L. No. 116-127, §§ 
7001(a), 7003(a), 134 Stat. 178, 210, 214 (2020). 
 13. See id. §§ 3105, 5102(a). 
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at their employer’s discretion but later admitted that the real figure 
might exceed that amount.14  Another conservative estimate found 
that 5% of the active workforce, or approximately 8 million health 
care workers and emergency responders, were affected.15  Seventy-
five percent of health care workers and emergency responders were 
women, and 39% were people of color, including Hispanic individuals 
and those in non-white racial categories.16 
Recognizing that the COVID-19 pandemic necessitated making 
sick leave accessible as soon as possible, Congress statutorily 
authorized the DOL to bypass notice and comment rulemaking and 
promulgate a binding regulation using the good cause exception.17  
However, for the first six months of the COVID-19 pandemic, the 
DOL exceeded its authority under the statute to further limit access 
to leave: it promulgated a final rule, inconsistent with the language of 
the FFCRA, allowing employers of any health care workers to 
exclude all their employees from emergency paid sick leave –– 
barring many more workers, like Luis, who were not health care 
providers and whom Congress did not intend to exclude.18 
In March of 2021, a federal court held that the DOL’s erroneous 
definition of “health care provider” should not apply to cases like 
Luis’s.  Instead, the court found that the statute’s definition of “health 
care provider” should be applied and denied the employer’s motion 
to dismiss Luis’s claim.19  A few federal courts have begun to correct 
 
 14. See Paid Leave Under the Families First Coronavirus Response Act, 85 Fed. 
Reg. 19,326, 19,343 (Apr. 6, 2020). An investigation by the DOL’s Office of Inspector 
General later found that this estimate “could be understated because it did not 
include all the occupations in the Department’s expanded definition for health care 
providers.” U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., REP. NO. 19-20-009-15-001, 
COVID-19: WHD NEEDS TO CLOSELY MONITOR THE PANDEMIC IMPACT ON ITS 
OPERATIONS 2–3 (2020). 
 15. See Michelle Long & Mathew Rae, Gaps in the Emergency Paid Sick Leave 
Law for Health Care Workers, KFF (June 17, 2020), https://www.kff.org/coronavirus-
covid-19/issue-brief/gaps-in-emergency-paid-sick-leave-law-for-health-care-workers/ 
[https://perma.cc/R44U-GT8E] (defining the health care and emergency response 
workforce as individuals who indicated that their job was in the Census code for 
pharmaceutical and medicine manufacturing; medical equipment and supplies 
manufacturing; offices of physicians; outpatient care centers; home health care 
services; other health care services; hospitals; nursing care facilities; residential care 
facilities without nursing; individual and family services; community food and housing 
and emergency services; and justice, public order, and safety activities). 
 16. See id. 
 17. See Families First Coronavirus Response Act § 5111; see also infra Sections 
I.A.ii–iii. 
 18. See infra Section I.C. 
 19. Beltran v. 2 Deer Park Drive Operations, LLC, No. 20-8454, 2021 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 37291, at *18–19 (D.N.J. Feb. 28, 2021). 
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the DOL’s error and retroactively restore the right to emergency paid 
sick leave to those who were wrongfully denied it during the first six 
months of the COVID-19 pandemic.20  This correction –– so far 
pursued by only a handful of plaintiffs –– has only been possible 
thanks to an activist state Attorney General, receptive federal courts, 
and the DOL’s eventual willingness to back down.21  It is impossible 
to know how many potential plaintiffs have lost wages and 
employment but did not and will not have their pay or employment 
restored because they and their employers relied on the erroneous 
rule. 
In part because the DOL abused its ability to promulgate a rule 
using the good cause exception to disregard Congress’s clear 
directive, the FFCRA was underinclusive and insufficiently 
responsive to an emergency in which millions of workers in the 
United States suddenly needed paid sick leave and family leave.  If 
the DOL had created a rule that was consistent with the FFCRA, 
more workers would have received paid sick leave, and fewer people 
may have died.22  The purpose of the good cause exception, which 
allows agencies to bypass a lengthy notice and comment procedure, is 
to provide agencies the flexibility needed to respond to emergencies 
quickly.23  The story of the United States’s emergency paid sick leave 
experiment demonstrates the serious problems that can arise when 
Congress statutorily authorizes an agency to bypass notice and 
comment.  While the agency may respond more quickly to 
emergencies and insulate itself from legal challenges to its decision to 
avoid notice and comment –– arguably good things in an emergency 
— the agency may also exceed its authority and promulgate a rule 
 
 20. See Simone v. Harborview Rehab. & Care Ctr., No. 20-3551, 2021 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 105053, at *8–12 (E.D. Pa. June 3, 2021) (following the approach of the courts 
in Beltran and Payne and applying the FFCRA’s definition of “health care provider” 
to a nursing home maintenance manager); see also Payne v. Woods Servs., Inc., No. 
20-4561, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28198, at *13–14 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2021) (holding 
that the definition of “health care provider” in the FFCRA is the appropriate 
definition to apply even though the April Rule was in place at the time of the 
Plaintiff’s firing). 
 21. See generally Simone, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105053, at *8–12; Payne, U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 28198, at *13–14. See also infra Sections I.C.ii–iii. 
 22. While empirical research on the impact of the DOL’s erroneous rule is 
lacking, some early studies have shown that people were more likely to stay home 
while quarantining when they had access to paid leave under the FFCRA. See infra 
text accompanying notes 158–60. 
 23. See infra Sections I.A.ii–iii and Part II. 
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inconsistent with congressional intent.24  When this happens, as it did 
when the DOL implemented the FFCRA, Congress itself has no 
immediate recourse, and interested parties are unable to formally 
share information and evidence with the agency.  Assuming a party 
has the requisite legal standing and resources to bring a claim in 
federal court, the slow and unpredictable nature of the judiciary 
makes it an unsuitable primary forum for ensuring agency 
accountability in an emergency.25  Thus, the loss of the main vehicle 
for public participation in agency rulemaking –– notice and comment 
–– deepens the democratic deficit of agencies whose immense power 
is delegated by Congress, not derived directly from the people.26 
Part I of this Note provides a general overview of notice and 
comment rulemaking, the good cause exception under the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and statutory authorization to 
bypass notice and comment.  It also explains how the FFCRA was 
passed by Congress and initially implemented by the DOL, and 
details how the DOL revised its implementation in response to a 
lawsuit by the New York Attorney General and an unfavorable 
federal district court ruling.  Part II presents arguments for and 
against reforming the good cause exception, examines empirical 
evidence of the FFCRA’s effectiveness and shortcomings, and offers 
alternative emergency rulemaking procedures in existence at the 
federal and state levels and alternatives proposed by scholars.  Part 
III of this Note proposes a framework of procedural safeguards 
Congress should stipulate in future emergency legislation where it 
statutorily authorizes the use of the good cause exception, including a 
mandatory 30-day post-promulgation comment period and expiration 
after 90 to 120 days unless the agency promulgates a permanent rule. 
I. CASE STUDY: EMERGENCY RULEMAKING AND THE FAMILIES 
FIRST CORONAVIRUS RESPONSE ACT 
The good cause exception is a long-established, narrowly available 
mechanism for agencies to bypass the notice and comment 
procedures normally required to create regulations.27  The decision to 
invoke the good cause exception under the APA typically lies with 
 
 24. See Kevin Hartnett, Jr., Comment, An Approach to Improving Judicial 
Review of the APA’s “Good Cause” Exception to Notice-and-Comment 
Rulemaking, 68 BUFF. L. REV. 1561, 1576 n.76 (2020). 
 25. See Connor Raso, Agency Avoidance of Rulemaking Procedures, 67 ADMIN. 
L. REV. 65, 81 (2015). 
 26. See infra Section II.A.ii. 
 27. See infra Sections I.A.i–ii. 
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the agency but is subject to judicial review.28  However, following 
national crises such as the September 11 terrorist attacks, 
environmental disasters, and the COVID-19 pandemic, Congress has 
passed emergency legislation authorizing rulemaking without notice 
and comment, so that agencies may implement the emergency law 
quickly to provide relief.29  The good cause exception and statutory 
authorization are two avenues for bypassing notice and comment, but 
agencies cite different statutory authority to get there –– the APA, an 
emergency statute, or sometimes both.30  Scholars, as well as Congress 
itself in authorizing statutes, often use the “good cause exception” to 
refer to both the APA and statutory authorization to bypass notice 
and comment.31 
A recent example of statutory authorization is the FFCRA, a 
bipartisan act passed in March 2020 at the outset of the United 
States’s COVID-19 pandemic.32  The FFCRA established paid leave 
related to the pandemic and authorized the DOL to create 
regulations governing this leave without notice and comment.33  
However, the DOL created a rule that contradicted the plain 
language of the statute, preventing a large but difficult to define 
group of U.S. workers from accessing this leave.34  The New York 
Attorney General sued the DOL and won in the Southern District of 
New York, prompting the DOL to correct the rule six months after its 
 
 28. See, e.g., Haw. Helicopter Operators Ass’n v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 51 F.3d 
212, 214 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) use 
of the good cause exception to promulgate air safety rules following fatal air tour 
accidents); Jifry v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 370 F.3d 1174, 1179–80 (D.C. Cir. 2004) 
(upholding the FAA’s use of the good cause exception to promulgate rules about 
airline pilot certification following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks). 
 29. See infra Section I.A.iii. 
 30. See infra Section I.A.iii. 
 31. See infra Section I.A.iii. This Note aims to use “good cause exception” to 
refer to the APA, not statutory authorization to bypass notice and comment. 
However, the FFCRA’s statutory authorization provision references the APA’s good 
cause exception; therefore this Note uses the terms interchangeably in that context. 
See infra Section I.B.iv. 
 32. See infra Section I.B.ii. 
 33. See infra Section I.B.v. 
 34. See U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 14, at 2–3; see 
also infra Section I.C. Empirical evidence is lacking on how many non-health care 
workers were excluded from accessing leave because of the overly broad April Rule; 
the DOL has indicated that using the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) on the health 
care sector underestimates those affected. See U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., OFF. OF 
INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 12, at 9. 
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creation, and only three months before the FFCRA itself was initially 
set to expire.35 
A. Administrative Law Background 
The APA governs the procedures federal agencies use to fulfill the 
policy responsibilities Congress has delegated to them.36  One of the 
purposes of the APA is to standardize administrative procedure.37  
The two primary tools agencies have at their disposal to implement 
statutes are rulemaking, which is quasi-legislative, and adjudication, 
which is quasi-judicial.38  Agencies may engage in formal or informal 
versions of either, and informal rulemaking and formal adjudication 
have long been the most common.39  It is well-settled that the 
judiciary will not require agencies to prioritize rulemaking over 
adjudication or vice versa.40 
i. Notice and Comment Rulemaking 
An agency action is a rule if it is a “statement of general or 
particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, 
interpret, or prescribe law or policy.”41  To create a rule, agencies may 
engage in informal rulemaking, also known as notice and comment 
rulemaking.42  First, the agency must issue a notice of proposed 
rulemaking (NPRM), published in the Federal Register, which must 
contain a “statement of the time, place, and nature of public rule 
making proceedings,” the legal authority for the proposed rule, and a 
 
 35. See infra Sections I.C.ii–iii. 
 36. See generally Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–59. 
 37. See Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 41 (1950) (“One purpose [of 
the APA] was to introduce greater uniformity of procedure and standardization of 
administrative practice among the diverse agencies whose customs had departed 
widely from each other.”), superseded by statute on other grounds, Supplemental 
Appropriation Act, 1951, 64 Stat. 1044, 1048, as recognized in Ardestani v. Immigr. & 
Naturalization Serv., 502 U.S. 129, 134 (1991). 
 38. 5 U.S.C. §§ 553–57. 
 39. Id.; see also William F. Pedersen, Jr., Formal Records and Informal 
Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38, 40 (1975) (“The two most common types of agency 
proceedings, producing orders and rules respectively, are known as formal 
adjudication and informal rulemaking.” (citation omitted)). 
 40. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947) (“[A]n administrative 
agency must be equipped to act either by general rule or by individual order. To insist 
upon one form of action to the exclusion of the other is to exalt form over 
necessity.”). 
 41. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4). 
 42. Id. §§ 553(b)–(c). 
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summary of the content of the proposed rule or of the subjects and 
issues involved.43 
Once notice is issued, the agency must give the public a meaningful 
opportunity to participate in the rulemaking by accepting written or 
oral comments, data, and arguments.44  The APA does not establish a 
uniform minimum comment period, but comment periods for most 
rulemakings stay open for at least 30 days.45  The executive branch 
has recommended comment periods of at least 60 days.46  While many 
agencies state that their policy is to allow comment periods of 60 days 
or longer, a 2011 study found that the mean duration is approximately 
39 days, and the median duration is 32 days.47  Agencies sometimes 
grant extensions to collect more information from interested parties 
or improve the quality of responses.48  The agency considers these 
submissions, then issues a “concise general statement of . . . basis and 
purpose” that responds to vital questions raised by materially cogent 
comments.49  However, if the final rule is modified in light of public 
 
 43. Id. §§ 553(b)(1)–(3). 
 44. Id. § 553(c); see also United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 
240, 251 (2d. Cir. 1977) (holding that under 5 U.S.C. § 553(c), the agency should have 
disclosed the scientific data they relied upon in creating the proposed rule so that 
interested persons would have a meaningful opportunity to respond during the 
comment period). 
 45. See Steven J. Balla, Public Commenting on Federal Agency Regulations: 
Research on Current Practices and Recommendations to the Administrative 
Conference of the United States 3–6 (Mar. 15, 2011) (unpublished report), 
https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Consolidated-Reports-%2B-
Memoranda.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y58U-N8AB]. 
 46. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993) (“[E]ach 
agency should afford the public a meaningful opportunity to comment on any 
proposed regulation, which in most cases should include a comment period of not less 
than 60 days.”); see also Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3,821 (Jan. 18, 2011) 
(“To the extent feasible and permitted by law, each agency shall afford the public a 
meaningful opportunity to comment through the Internet on any proposed 
regulation, with a comment period that should generally be at least 60 days.”); 
Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 86 Fed. Reg. 
7,223 (Jan. 20, 2021) (“This memorandum reaffirms the basic principles set forth in 
[Executive Order 12866] and in Executive Order 13563 . . . .”). 
 47. See Balla, supra note 45, at 3–4 (explaining the main arguments for long 
comment periods — to give interested parties adequate time to respond to often 
sophisticated proposals — and short comment periods — ensuring that rulemaking is 
efficient and generates information that will be useful to agency decisionmakers). 
 48. See id. at 7. 
 49. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c); see also Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d at 252–53 
(“It is not in keeping with the rational process to leave vital questions, raised by 
comments which are of cogent materiality, completely unanswered.”). 
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comments, it must be a “logical outgrowth” of the proposed rule.50  A 
final rule is a “logical outgrowth” of a proposed rule only if interested 
parties could have anticipated that the change was possible, and thus 
reasonably should have participated in the comment period.51 
ii. The APA’s Good Cause Exception 
Unless the enabling statute52 requires notice and comment 
rulemaking, the APA allows agencies to elect to bypass this 
procedure “when the agency for good cause finds” that using notice 
and comment would be “impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to 
the public interest.”53  The agency must include a brief statement of 
its reasoning for finding good cause in the rule issued.54 
The decision to use the APA’s good cause exception usually rests 
with the agency and may be challenged in federal court.55  The good 
cause exception is not meant to be an “‘escape clause’ in the sense 
that the agency has discretion to disregard . . . the facts[,]” but is 
“narrowly construed and only reluctantly countenanced” by the 
judiciary.56  The Ninth Circuit regards the good cause exception as 
 
 50. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3); see also Veterans Just. Grp. v. Sec’y of Veterans Affs., 
818 F.3d 1336, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“Where a proposed rule is modified in light of 
public comment, the modified rule may be promulgated as a final rule without 
additional notice and opportunity for comment, so long as the final rule is a ‘logical 
outgrowth’ of the proposed rule . . . . A final rule is a logical outgrowth of a proposed 
rule only if interested parties should have anticipated that the change was possible, 
and thus reasonably should have filed their comments on the subject during the 
notice-and-comment period.” (internal citations and quotations omitted)). 
 51. Veterans Just. Grp., 818 F.3d at 1344; see also Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. 
v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 167–68, 174–75 (2007) (holding that, unless Congress 
specifically tasks the agency with making a rule, withdrawal of a proposed rule is 
reasonably foreseeable and therefore a logical outgrowth); Allina Health Servs. v. 
Sebelius, 746 F.3d 1102, 1108–09 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding that a final rule that is the 
opposite result of the proposed rule is not reasonably foreseeable and is therefore not 
a logical outgrowth). 
 52. Enabling statute has been defined as “a statute that confers (as to an 
administrative agency) the power or authority to engage in conduct not previously 
allowed.” Enabling Statute, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/legal/enabling%20statute [https://perma.cc/H3WF-PBHR] (last visited 
Oct. 31, 2021). 
 53. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B). 
 54. Id. 
 55. See sources cited supra note 28. 
 56. N.J. Dep’t of Env’t Prot. v. EPA, 626 F.2d 1038, 1045–46 (D.C. Cir. 1980) 
(quoting S. DOC. NO.79-248, at 200 (1946)); see also Jifry v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 
370 F.3d 1174, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“The exception excuses notice and comment in 
emergency situations, or where delay could result in serious harm.” (internal citations 
omitted)). 
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“essentially an emergency procedure” because emergencies “are the 
most common” situations that justify the exception.57  However, 
agencies have increasingly used the good cause exception in recent 
decades.  From 1995 to 2012, one scholar found that agencies 
exempted almost 52% of rules from notice and comment.58  A 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) study in 2012 found that 
from 2003 to 2010, agencies cited the good cause exception for 61% of 
nonmajor rules and 77% of major rules.59  The federal circuit courts 
apply different standards when reviewing an agency’s decision to use 
the good cause exception, such as arbitrary and capricious or de novo 
review.60 
While agencies successfully employing the good cause exception 
are not required to receive comments, sometimes they invite 
comments after the rule has taken effect.  This process is called 
“interim final rulemaking,” whereby the rule takes effect 
immediately, but the agency may choose to revise it based on 
comments received post-promulgation.61  The Administrative 
Conference of the United States (ACUS), an independent federal 
agency that recommends improvements to administrative process and 
procedure, has recommended that agencies receive comments post-
promulgation when they invoke the good cause exception because 
notice and comment would be “impracticable” or “contrary to the 
public interest.”62  ACUS does not recommend a post-promulgation 
comment period, however, for rules that address temporary 
emergencies or “expire by their own terms within a relatively brief 
period,” such as a rule that closes airspace for an air show.63 
 
 57. United States v. Valverde, 628 F.3d 1159, 1164–65 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 58. Raso, supra note 25, at 91–92 n.125 (noting that the DOL exempted 50.4% of 
final rules from notice and comment during the same period). 
 59. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-21, FEDERAL RULEMAKING: 
AGENCIES COULD TAKE ADDITIONAL STEPS TO RESPOND TO PUBLIC COMMENTS 37 
(2012). 
 60. Compare Sorensen Comm. Ltd. v. FCC, 755 F.3d 702, 706 (D.C. Cir. 2014) 
(applying de novo review), and United States v. Reynolds, 710 F.3d 498, 502 (3d Cir. 
2013) (noting that “the Fourth and Sixth Circuits have not stated a standard but 
appear to use de novo review” and declining to decide the appropriate standard of 
review), with United States v. Johnson, 632 F.3d 912, 928 (5th Cir. 2011) (applying 
arbitrary and capricious review), and United States v. Dean, 604 F.3d 1275, 1278 
(11th Cir. 2010) (applying arbitrary and capricious review). See generally Hartnett, 
supra note 24. 
 61. ADMIN. CONF. OF THE U.S., RECOMMENDATION 95-4: PROCEDURES FOR 
NONCONTROVERSIAL AND EXPEDITED RULEMAKING (1995). 
 62. Id. at 4. 
 63. Id. at 4–5. 
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iii. Statutory Authorization to Bypass Notice and                     
Comment Rulemaking 
Occasionally, Congress will statutorily authorize or require an 
agency to promulgate a permanent rule without using notice and 
comment.64  In these cases, the agency usually cites the statute rather 
than the APA’s good cause exception provision as its authority to 
bypass notice and comment.65  Congress may simply require or 
authorize the agency to bypass notice and comment, or may reference 
the good cause exception of the APA.66  The GAO analyzed 123 
major rules from 2003 to 2010 that were promulgated without notice 
and comment and found that 38 of them cited 18 different statutory 
authorities either requiring or authorizing agencies to do so.67  The 
GAO found that about 70% of the 123 rules involved distributing 
federal payments to the public, such as disaster relief and health care 
cost reimbursements; foregoing notice and comment expedited the 
distribution of funds to beneficiaries.68 
Statutory authorization has proven a useful tool in emergencies.  
For example, two months after the September 11 terrorist attacks, 
Congress passed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, which 
created the Transportation Security Administration, led by an 
Administrator.69  The statute provides that “if the Administrator 
determines that a regulation or security directive must be issued 
immediately in order to protect transportation security, the 
Administrator shall issue the regulation or security directive without 
providing notice or an opportunity for comment and without prior 
approval of the Secretary [of Transportation].”70  Further, the GAO 
study identified several statutes authorizing agencies to bypass notice 
 
 64. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-21, supra note 59, at 18, 20–21. 
 65. Id. at 20–21. 
 66. Compare Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 
Stat. 597, 600 (2001) (to be codified as 49 U.S.C. § 114(l)(2)(A)) (“[T]he Under 
Secretary shall issue the regulation . . . without providing notice or an opportunity for 
comment . . . .”), with Families First Coronavirus Response Act, Pub. L. No. 116-127, 
§ 5111, 134 Stat. 178, 201 (2020) (to be codified as 29 U.S.C. § 2601 note) (“The 
Secretary of Labor shall have the authority to issue regulations for good cause under 
sections 553(b)(B) and 553(d)(A) of title 5, United States Code . . . .”). 
 67. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-21, supra note 59, at 18, 20–
21; see also id. at 3 n.6 (“A major rule is one that, among other things, has resulted in 
or is likely to result in an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more.”). 
 68. Id. at 21. 
 69. 49 U.S.C. §§ 114(a)–(b)(1). 
 70. Id. § 114(l)(2)(A). 
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and comment to establish climate-related disaster relief programs.71  
However, statutory authorization is also used outside the emergency 
context — the 2008 Farm Bill required that certain programs be 
implemented without notice and comment, resulting in 12 major 
rules.72 
B. The FFCRA Statute: Creation and Design 
Congress statutorily authorized the use of the good cause exception 
in the FFCRA.73  Because statutory authorization has become a key 
way for Congress to direct agencies to implement emergency relief, 
the FFCRA is a crucial case study of the problems that can arise when 
Congress explicitly permits an agency to bypass notice and comment 
rulemaking and imposes no other procedural requirements to address 
the democracy deficit that ensues.74 
i. Emergency Paid Sick Leave Was the Product of                  
Bipartisan Compromise 
That the FFCRA was the product of bipartisan compromise makes 
it even more troubling that the DOL under then-President Donald J. 
Trump would abuse its ability to bypass notice and comment to flout 
the plain meaning of the statute and bar some workers from 
emergency paid sick leave.  Prior to March 2020, there was no 
federally guaranteed paid sick time or paid family leave in the United 
States, making the U.S. an outlier among countries ranked highly for 
economic and human development.75  The COVID-19 pandemic 
changed that, prompting the infamously gridlocked U.S. Congress to 
 
 71. For example, a rule establishing disaster relief programs to provide hurricane 
assistance after four particularly devastating hurricanes in 2005; rules establishing 
disaster relief programs for livestock and catfish producers in disaster or emergency 
areas during a two-year period; and a rule establishing an assistance program for 
livestock, honeybee, and farm-raised fish producers who suffered losses due to 
disease or adverse weather such as blizzards and wildfires. U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-21, supra note 59, at 47–48, 55. 
 72. Id. at 7; see also id. at 18–19 (featuring a table showing 12 major rules). 
 73. Families First Coronavirus Response Act, Pub. L. No. 116-127, § 5111, 134 
Stat. 178, 201 (2020). 
 74. See Nicholas Bagley, Remedial Restraint in Administrative Law, 117 COLUM. 
L. REV. 253, 260 (2017) (explaining that agencies lack the “democratic pedigree” 
possessed by Congress and its institutional capacity to channel public values). 
 75. See HYE JIN RHO, SHAWN FREMSTAD & JARED GABY-BIEGEL, CTR. FOR 
ECON. & POL’Y RSCH., CONTAGION NATION 2020: UNITED STATES STILL THE ONLY 
WEALTHY NATION WITHOUT PAID SICK LEAVE 3 (2020) (comparing the United States 
to 21 other countries with high living standards according to the United Nations’ 
Human Development Index). 
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negotiate bipartisan legislation to address the impending national 
crisis.  On January 20, 2020, the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention confirmed the United States’s first COVID-19 case in 
Washington State.76  On March 18, 2020, Representative Nita Lowey 
of New York introduced the FFCRA.77 
On March 12 and 13, 2020, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) 
and Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin engaged in intense 
negotiations, speaking by phone 13 times before reaching a deal.78  
Shortly thereafter, then-President Donald J. Trump endorsed the 
FFCRA on Twitter, specifically the paid sick leave provision, and 
encouraged all Republicans and Democrats to vote for it.79  In the 
early hours of March 14, 2020, the U.S. House of Representatives 
passed the FFCRA with overwhelming bipartisan support.80  House 
Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy (R-CA) offered rare praise of 
 
 76. See Morning Edition, 1st Case of Coronavirus Confirmed in Washington 
State, NPR (Jan. 22, 2020, 5:06 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/01/22/798392221/1st-u-
s-case-of-coronavirus-confirmed-in-washington-state [https://perma.cc/NQ8Y-P256]. 
But see Jaclyn Diaz, Coronavirus Was in U.S. Weeks Earlier Than Previously 




 77. See H.R. 6201, 116th Cong. (2020). 
 78. Erica Werner et al., House Passes Coronavirus Economic Relief Package with 
Trump’s Support, WASH. POST (Mar. 14, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/us-
policy/2020/03/13/paid-leave-democrats-trump-deal-coronavirus/ 
[https://perma.cc/5NB9-ZVLY]. 
 79. Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Mar. 13, 2020, 8:42 PM), 
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22%5C%22free+coronavirus+tests
%5C%22%22 [https://perma.cc/3293-ZFAG] (“I fully support H.R. 6201: Families 
First CoronaVirus Response Act, which will be voted on in the House this evening. 
This bill will follow my direction for free CoronaVirus tests, and paid sick leave for 
our impacted American Workers. I have directed . . . . ”); Donald Trump 
(@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Mar. 13, 2020, 8:42 PM), https://www.
thetrumparchive.com/?searchbox=%22I+encourage+all+Republicans+and+Democra
ts+to+come+together+and+VOTE+YES%21%22 [https://perma.cc/7GD3-Z56S] 
(“ . . .  the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of Labor to issue regulations 
that will provide flexibility so that in no way will Small Businesses be hurt. I 
encourage all Republicans and Democrats to come together and VOTE YES! I will 
always put . . . . ”); Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Mar. 13, 8:42 
PM), https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?results=1&searchbox=%22being+of+
American+families+FIRST.+%22 [https://perma.cc/U7UH-557F] (“ . . .  the health 
and well-being of American families FIRST. Look forward to signing the final Bill, 
ASAP!”). 
 80. The House of Representatives passed the FFCRA 363-40: 223 Democrats and 
140 Republicans were in favor, 40 Republicans opposed; nine Democrats and 17 
Republicans did not vote. Roll Call 102/Bill Number: H.R. 6201, U.S. HOUSE 
REPRESENTATIVES CLERK (Mar. 14, 2020, 12:51 AM), 
https://clerk.house.gov/Votes/2020102 [https://perma.cc/GA8G-KMXG]. 
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Speaker Pelosi for inviting House Republicans to “come together to 
put the American public first.”81  Then-President Trump again took 
to Twitter to praise the “[g]ood teamwork between Republicans & 
Democrats” in passing the FFCRA.82 
Two amendments that were proposed, but ultimately failed, 
demonstrate the truly bipartisan nature of the final bill.  On March 
18, 2020, Senator Patty Murray (D-WA) proposed an amendment 
that would have provided protected paid sick time to employees 
nationwide for themselves or to care for a sick family member or 
child; employees would have earned one hour of paid sick time for 
every 30 hours worked, and the employer would have been 
reimbursed by the Treasury Department for the wages paid to the 
individual using such leave in 2020 and 2021.83  The amendment failed 
along party lines with all Democrats in favor and all Republicans 
opposed.84  Senator Ron Johnson (R-WI) proposed an amendment 
that would have stricken emergency paid sick leave and family leave 
and the attendant tax credit in their entirety but would have instituted 
a tax credit for state-provided unemployment insurance to those who 
could not work due to the same COVID-19-related reasons as 
provided for in the original bill.85  The amendment failed, nearly 
along party lines.86  Shortly thereafter, the U.S. Senate passed the 
FFCRA almost unanimously.87  President Trump signed the FFCRA 
into law later that day.88 
 
 81. Werner et al., supra note 78. 
 82. Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Mar. 14, 2020, 7:37 AM), 
https://www.thetrumparchive.com/?results=1&searchbox=%22good+teamwork%22 
[https://perma.cc/798G-QDMF]. 
 83. 166 CONG. REC. S1, 808–810 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 2020) (SA 1559 Title I Sec. 
201(b)(1), Title III Sec. 302(a)(1)(A)). 




 85. 166 CONG. REC. S1,808 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 2020). 
 86. Forty-eight Republicans and two Democrats were in favor, 45 Democrats and 
three Republicans were opposed; two Republicans did not vote. Roll Call Vote 116th 
Congress — 2nd Session, U.S. SENATE (Mar. 18, 2020, 2:53 PM), 
https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress
=116&session=2&vote=00075 [https://perma.cc/G8A9-R3UT]. 
 87. The Senate passed the FFCRA 90-8; the eight Nays were Republicans, and 
two Republicans did not vote. Roll Call Vote 116th Congress — 2nd Session, U.S. 
SENATE (Mar. 18, 2020, 3:32 PM), https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/
roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=116&session=2&vote=00076 
[https://perma.cc/J4M3-3RRY]. 
 88. H.R. 6201, 116th Cong. (2020). 
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ii. The Families First Coronavirus Response Act 
The FFCRA contained two acts related to emergency leave: the 
Emergency Paid Sick Leave Act (EPSLA), which provided eligible 
U.S. workers with two weeks of emergency paid sick leave should 
they or someone in their household receive a quarantine order due to 
the  COVID-19 disease, and the Emergency Family Medical Leave 
Expansion Act (Expanded FMLA), which expanded the Family 
Medical Leave Act to allow parents to take leave due to COVID-19-
related school and childcare closures.89  While employers were 
required to provide paid leave upfront, the federal government 
footed the bill: employers could claim a tax credit equivalent to 100% 
of the qualified sick and family leave wages paid.90 
The EPSLA provided for 80 hours — two five-day, 40-hour work 
weeks — of paid sick leave for full-time employees who were unable 
to work due to at least one of six qualifying reasons related to 
COVID-19: (1) the employee was subject to a government-issued 
quarantine or isolation order; (2) a health care provider advised the 
employee to self-quarantine; (3) the employee was symptomatic and 
seeking a diagnosis; (4) the employee was caring for someone who 
falls under (1) or (2); (5) the employee was caring for their child 
whose place of care was closed; or (6) the employee was experiencing 
“any other substantially similar condition” specified by the Secretary 
of Health and Human Services in consultation with the DOL and 
Treasury Department.91  Emergency paid sick leave was limited to ten 
days because, according to one critic, “Republican leadership in the 
House and Senate didn’t want to set a precedent” that could fuel 
momentum for a national paid leave policy.92 
Expanded FMLA created an additional reason why an employee 
could take ten weeks of paid leave under the 1993 Family Medical 
Leave Act (FMLA) if they were: 
[U]nable to work (or telework) due to a need for leave to care for 
the son or daughter under 18 years of age of such employee if the 
school or place of care has been closed, or the child care provider of 
 
 89. See generally Families First Coronavirus Response Act, Pub. L. No. 116-127, 
§§ 3101–106, 5101–111, 134 Stat. 178, 189–92, 195–201 (2020). 
 90. See id. §§ 7001(a), 7003(a), 134 Stat. at 210, 214. 
 91. See id. §§ 5102(a)–(b). Part-time workers were entitled to the average number 
of hours they worked over a typical two-week period. Id. § 5102(b)(2)(B). 
 92. See Steven Findlay, Congress Left Big Gaps in the Paid Sick Days and Paid 
Leave Provisions of the Coronavirus Emergency Legislation, HEALTH AFFS. BLOG 
(Apr. 29, 2020), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20200424.223002/full/ 
[https://perma.cc/84AD-3EJR]. 
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such son or daughter is unavailable, due to a public health 
emergency.93 
This family leave could be combined with emergency paid sick leave 
for a total of 12 weeks of leave. 
Because the FFCRA resulted from genuine political compromise, 
it already contained significant exceptions before the DOL exceeded 
the bounds of the statute to bar even more U.S. workers from 
accessing leave.  The first major exception was based on employer 
size.  While all public employers were subject to the FFCRA, private 
employers with 500 or more employees were not.94  In 2020, 
approximately 59.7 million individuals worked for private-sector 
employers that employed 500 or more employees, thus the FFCRA 
excluded nearly 48% of the private sector workforce.95  The 
justification was that large companies already offer paid leave and 
therefore did not require a federal tax subsidy.96  The DOL later 
estimated that in March 2020, 88% of private industry workers at 
establishments with 500 or more employees had access to paid sick 
leave.97  However, it is unlikely that this group had access to the paid 
sick leave equivalent of what the FFCRA guaranteed; about two-
thirds of employees with paid sick leave accrue a fixed number of 
paid sick days per year, and only 28% of that group have 10 to 14 
days after one year of service.98  Further, 79% of employees with paid 
sick leave either cannot carry over unused sick days to future years or 
are limited; in the private sector, the median cap is 20 days.99  Finally, 
access to paid sick leave differs drastically across the income 
 
 93. Families First Coronavirus Response Act § 3102. 
 94. See id. § 5110(2)(B)(i)(I)(aa), 134 Stat. at 199. 
 95. See Table F: Distribution of Private Sector Employment by Firm Size Class: 
1993/Q1 Through 2019/Q1, Not Seasonally Adjusted, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT., 
https://www.bls.gov/web/cewbd/table_f.txt [https://perma.cc/N64M-2295] (last visited 
Oct. 4, 2021). 
 96. See Findlay, supra note 92. 
 97. U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., USDL-20-1792, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN THE UNITED 
STATES — MARCH 2020 3 (2020) [hereinafter USDL-20-1792], 
https://perma.cc/CWW3-KJPC. Notably, DOL released these estimates immediately 
following the New York Attorney General’s successful lawsuit challenging the DOL’s 
underinclusive implementation of the FFCRA, a damning report by the DOL’s 
Office of the Inspector General, and the DOL’s revision of its regulations, and 
therefore may be seen as an attempt to retroactively justify the DOL’s actions. See 
infra Section I.C. 
 98. Drew DeSilver, As Coronavirus Spreads, Which U.S. Workers Have Paid Sick 
Leave — And Which Don’t?, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Mar. 12, 2020), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/03/12/as-coronavirus-spreads-which-u-s-
workers-have-paid-sick-leave-and-which-dont/ [https://perma.cc/57UE-9EXZ]. 
 99. Id. 
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spectrum; it is “nearly universal at the upper ends of the wage 
distribution” and “becomes scarcer the less money one makes.”100 
The FFCRA also provided that employers with fewer than 50 
employees could claim an exemption “when the imposition of such 
requirements would jeopardize the viability of the business as a going 
concern.”101  In 2020, 33.8 million individuals, or approximately 27% 
of the private-sector workforce, worked for employers with fewer 
than 50 employees.102  The DOL estimated that in March 2020, 67% 
of private industry workers employed by small businesses had access 
to paid sick leave.103  This carve-out likely sought to protect small 
businesses from a large and sudden cost while the U.S. economy was 
in freefall, but critics point out that such a cost was only upfront 
because the federal government would reimburse firms for the leave 
provided via a tax credit.104 
The compromises congressional Republicans obtained limited the 
scope of COVID-19-related paid sick leave, though congressional 
Democrats still sought to fill the gaps in the FFCRA.  On May 15, 
2020, the House passed the HEROES Act, which would have 
expanded the FFCRA to employers with 500 or more employees and 
removed the health care provider exemption.105  The bill died in the 
Republican-controlled Senate.106  Despite the election of President 
Joseph R. Biden and the Democrats narrowly winning back the 
Senate, Democrats did not prioritize preserving or expanding 
emergency paid family and sick leave.  This is evident in the FFCRA’s 
eventual extension.  As originally designed, the mandate that 
 
 100. Id. 92% of workers in the top quarter of earnings (making more than $32.21 
per hour) had access to some form of paid sick leave in 2019, compared to just 31% 
of workers in the lowest-earning tenth (making $10.80 per hour or less). Id. 
 101. Families First Coronavirus Response Act, Pub. L. No. 116-127, §§ 3102, 
5111(2), 134 Stat. 178, 189, 201 (2020); see also Families First Coronavirus Response 
Act: Questions and Answers, U.S. DEP’T LAB. [hereinafter FFCRA Q&A, U.S. DEP’T 
OF LAB.], https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/pandemic/ffcra-questions#58 
[https://perma.cc/F2ST-TX42] (last visited Nov. 7, 2021) (explaining when “small 
business exemption apply to exclude a small business from the provisions of the 
Emergency Paid Sick Leave Act and Emergency Family and Medical Leave 
Expansion Act”). 
 102. See Table F: Distribution of Private Sector Employment by Firm Size Class: 
1993/Q1 Through 2019/Q1, supra note 95. 
 103. See USDL-20-1792, supra note 97, at 18. 
 104. See Findlay, supra note 92. 
 105. See H.R. 6800, 116th Cong. (2020). 
 106. Id.; see also Long & Rae, supra note 15. 
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employers provide this leave expired on December 31, 2020.107  
However, on December 27, 2020, Congress amended the FFCRA to 
allow employers to voluntarily provide leave through March 31, 2021, 
and still receive the attendant tax credit.108  President Biden’s 
COVID-19 “American Rescue Plan” had initially proposed 
reinstating mandatory leave through the end of September 2021, but 
the final version of the stimulus package merely extended optional 
leave through September 30, 2021.109 
iii. The Health Care Providers and First Responders Exception 
The FFCRA also provided that “[a]n employer of an employee 
who is a health care provider or an emergency responder may elect to 
exclude such employee” from emergency paid sick leave and 
Expanded FMLA.110  In defining “health care provider,” the FFCRA 
adopted the 1993 FMLA definition.111  The FMLA defines “health 
care provider” as “a doctor of medicine or osteopathy” authorized to 
practice by a State or “any other person determined by the Secretary 
[of Labor] to be capable of providing health care services.”112  The 
FFCRA’s “health care provider” exception was perhaps justified by 
the essential nature of health care services during the pandemic and 
this group’s existing access to leave.113  The FFCRA was not the only 
paid sick leave option for health care workers; the DOL estimated 
that 84% of health care and social assistance employees in the private 
 
 107. Families First Coronavirus Response Act, Pub. L. No. 116-127, §§ 3102(a)(1), 
5109, 134 Stat. 178, 189, 198 (2020). See generally FFCRA Q&A, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., 
supra note 101. 
 108. See FFCRA Q&A, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., supra note 101. 
 109. See H.R. 1319, 117th Cong. (2021); see also Evandro C. Gigante et al., 
Congress Passes American Rescue Plan: What Employers Need to Know, NAT’L L. 
REV. (Mar. 11, 2021), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/congress-passes-
american-rescue-plan-what-employers-need-to-know [https://perma.cc/SYL2-
BGMT]; Tami Luhby & Katie Lobosco, Here’s What’s in the Senate Stimulus Plan, 
CNN (Mar. 6, 2021, 4:23 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2021/03/04/politics/stimulus-
senate-democrats-proposal/index.html [https://perma.cc/QNE3-ZJJR]. 
 110. Families First Coronavirus Response Act §§ 3105, 5102(a). 
 111. See id. § 5110(4). 
 112. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(6). 
 113. No member of Congress justified or criticized exempting health care providers 
from emergency paid sick leave on the record while the FFCRA was being debated 
from March 13–18, 2020. See generally 166 CONG. REC. H1,687 (2020).  Senator 
Charles Schumer (D-NY) came the closest when he stated, “[p]ublic health officials 
and researchers and doctors on the frontlines must continue to do the difficult and 
noble work they are now engaged in” while “[t]he American people must hunker 
down.” 116 CONG. REC. S1,749 (2020) (statement of Sen. Charles Schumer). 
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industry had access to paid sick leave.114  However, while most health 
care employers already offered paid sick leave, such leave usually 
requires accrual and therefore did not guarantee ten days of 
quarantine leave, as the FFCRA did.115 
iv. Congress Statutorily Authorized Rule Promulgation              
Without Notice and Comment 
Recognizing the need to make paid leave accessible to U.S. 
workers immediately, Congress statutorily authorized the DOL to 
bypass notice and comment rulemaking procedures to implement the 
FFCRA.  The FFCRA provides that the DOL “shall have the 
authority to issue regulations for good cause” under the APA “to 
exclude certain health care providers and emergency responders from 
the definition of employee” under the FFCRA, “including by 
allowing the employer of such health care providers and emergency 
responders to opt out.”116  However, the need for an immediately 
effective rule created the risk of a bad one.  By explicitly authorizing 
the DOL to invoke the good cause exception, Congress protected the 
DOL from a procedural challenge on those grounds, even if the rule 
“offered little in substance to protect American families from 
economic harm resulting from COVID-19.”117  Though, at least one 
commentator has recognized that had Congress not authorized the 
use of the good cause exception, the DOL probably would have been 
entitled to use it anyway.118 
C. The FFCRA Regulation: Implementation, Legal Challenge,   
and Revision 
Shortly after Congress passed the FFCRA, the DOL invoked its 
statutory authority to implement the law without notice and 
comment.119  The DOL’s overly-broad definition of a “health care 
provider” received heavy criticism from Congress and the interested 
public.120  However, because of Congress’s statutory authorization to 
use the good cause exception, the only formal venue to challenge the 
 
 114. See USDL-20-1792, supra note 97, at 18. 
 115. See Long & Rae, supra note 15. 
 116. Families First Coronavirus Response Act § 5111(1) (emphasis added). 
 117. See Hartnett, supra note 24. 
 118. See id. 
 119. Paid Leave Under the Families First Coronavirus Response Act, 85 Fed. Reg. 
19,326, 19,342 (Apr. 6, 2020). 
 120. See infra Section I.C.i. 
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DOL’s rule was in federal court, which the New York Attorney 
General did successfully.121  As a result, the DOL revised its rule in 
September 2020, after six months of erroneously curtailing workers’ 
ability to access paid sick leave.122 
i. The DOL’s Initial Implementation of the FFCRA                           
and Early Critiques 
Because Congress statutorily authorized the use of the good cause 
exception, the DOL was able to act extraordinarily quickly to 
implement the FFCRA with a binding regulation.  On April 6, 2020, 
the DOL published a Final Rule implementing the FFCRA, effective 
April 2, 2020.123  The DOL invoked its authority under both the APA 
and the FFCRA to bypass notice and comment, explaining that it 
sought to “avoid economic harm to American families” facing 
“difficult choices in balancing work, child care, and the need to seek 
medical attention for illness caused by the virus.”124  Notice and 
comment rulemaking “would likely delay final action on this matter 
by weeks or months, and would, therefore, complicate and likely 
preclude the [DOL] from successfully exercising the authority created 
by” the FFCRA.125  Finally, the DOL recognized that delaying 
implementation of the FFCRA would run counter to FFCRA’s main 
purpose of “enabling employees to leave the workplace now to help 
prevent the spread of COVID-19.”126  However, because the rule’s 
creation was so rushed, on April 10, 2020, the DOL made minor 
amendments, effective on that day.127  The April Rule defined “health 
care provider” for the purposes of the exemption extremely 
broadly.128  For example, “an English professor, librarian, or cafeteria 
 
 121. See infra Section I.C.ii. 
 122. See infra Section I.C.iii. 
 123. Paid Leave Under the Families First Coronavirus Response Act, 85 Fed. Reg. 
at 19,326. 
 124. See id. at 19,342. 
 125. See id. 
 126. See id. 
 127. Paid Leave Under the Families First Coronavirus Response Act, 85 Fed. Reg. 
20,156 (Apr. 10, 2020). 
 128. The April Rule defined “health care provider” accordingly: 
(i) For the purposes of this definition Employees who may be exempted 
from Paid Sick Leave or Expanded Family and Medical Leave by their 
Employer under the FFCRA, a health care provider is anyone employed at 
any doctor’s office, hospital, health care center, clinic, post-secondary 
educational institution offering health care instruction, medical school, local 
health department or agency, nursing facility, retirement facility, nursing 
home, home health care provider, any facility that performs laboratory or 
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manager at a university with a medical school would all be ‘health 
care providers’ under the Rule.”129 
The April Rule was strongly criticized by Congress and former 
government officials almost immediately after it was implemented.  
On the day the rule went into effect, two members of Congress sent a 
letter to then-Labor Secretary Eugene Scalia explaining that the 
overbroad health care provider exemption “violate[d] congressional 
intent” and providing the appropriate interpretation.130  In addition, 
three former Obama-era DOL officials characterized the Trump 
Administration’s DOL as working “aggressively to restrict benefits 
that Congress clearly intended to provide” in its implementation of 
the FFCRA.131  In their view, the FFCRA’s health care provider 
exception was narrow, and the DOL had taken advantage to over-
broaden it: “[T]he cashier in a hospital gift shop or even a contractor 
that provides payroll processing for a medical school could be denied 
 
medical testing, pharmacy, or any similar institution, Employer, or entity. 
This includes any permanent or temporary institution, facility, location, or 
site where medical services are provided that are similar to such institutions. 
 
(ii) This definition includes any individual employed by an entity that 
contracts with any of these institutions described above to provide services 
or to maintain the operation of the facility where that individual’s services 
support the operation of the facility. This also includes anyone employed by 
any entity that provides medical services, produces medical products, or is 
otherwise involved in the making of COVID-19 related medical equipment, 
tests, drugs, vaccines, diagnostic vehicles, or treatments. This also includes 
any individual that the highest official of a State or territory, including the 
District of Columbia, determines is a health care provider necessary for that 
State’s or territory’s or the District of Columbia’s response to COVID-19. 
 
(iii) Application limited to leave under the EPSLA and the EFMLEA. The 
definition of “health care provider” contained in this subsection applies only 
for the purpose of determining whether an Employer may elect to exclude 
an Employee from taking leave under the EPSLA and/or the EFMLEA, 
and does not otherwise apply for purposes of the FMLA or section 
5102(A)(2) of the EPSLA.”). 
See id. at 19,351 § 826.30(c)(1). 
 129. New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., 477 F. Supp. 3d 1, 14 (S.D.N.Y. 2020); see 
also Complaint at 17–18, New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., 477 F. Supp. 3d 1 
(S.D.N.Y. 2020) (No. 20 Civ. 3020), 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137116. 
 130. Letter from Patty Murray, U.S. Sen., & Rosa DeLauro, U.S. Rep., to Eugene 
Scalia, Sec’y of Lab., U.S. Dep’t of Lab. (Apr. 1, 2020) [hereinafter Murray & 
DeLauro Letter]. 
 131. Chris Lu, M. Patricia Smith & David Weil, Why Americans Don’t Know 
About Their Right to Paid Sick Leave, NEWSWEEK (May 4, 2020, 9:00 AM), 
https://www.newsweek.com/why-americans-dont-know-about-their-right-paid-sick-
leave-opinion-1501532 [https://perma.cc/K3EP-C8QV]. 
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paid sick leave . . . .”132  Still, the DOL did not budge, and the April 
Rule remained law. 
ii. The N.Y. Attorney General’s Lawsuit and the S.D.N.Y. Decision 
While the DOL was unresponsive to these calls for revision, New 
York Attorney General Letitia James’s office was listening.  On April 
14, 2020, Attorney General James sued the DOL in the Southern 
District of New York — New York being the only state to do so on 
this basis — arguing in part that the DOL’s Final Rule expanded the 
term “health care provider” “far beyond both its plain meaning and 
the FMLA definition” adopted by the FFCRA, therefore “expos[ing] 
millions of American workers to exclusion from emergency family 
leave and paid sick leave as authorized by the FFCRA.”133 
In New York v. U.S. Department of Labor, S.D.N.Y. Judge Paul 
Oetken agreed with New York that the DOL overly restricted access 
to leave.134  The court struck down the DOL’s broad definition of 
“health care provider” because “the statute unambiguously forecloses 
the Final Rule’s definition.”135  The FFCRA’s “broad grant of 
authority” to promulgate a rule without notice and comment “is not 
limitless.”136  The statute directed the DOL to determine which 
employees were capable of providing health care services and 
promulgate a regulation excluding them; instead, the DOL’s 
definition “hinges entirely on the identity of the employer.”137  The 
court noted that even if the statute was ambiguous and it gave 
credence to the DOL’s purposive argument –– that a broad definition 
exempts employees essential to the healthcare system during the 
pandemic –– the DOL’s definition “cannot stand” because it 
“includes employees whose roles bear no nexus whatsoever to the 
provision of healthcare services, except the identity of their 
employers, and who are not even arguably necessary or relevant to 
the healthcare system’s vitality.”138  A report by the DOL’s Office of 
Inspector General (OIG) published shortly after the ruling also found 
that the April Rule “significantly broadened the definition of health 
care providers . . . as opposed to the original definition established by 
 
 132. Id. 
 133. Complaint, supra note 129. 
 134. 477 F. Supp. 3d 1, 15 (S.D.N.Y. 2020). 
 135. Id. at 14. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 14–15 (emphasis in original). 
 138. Id. at 15 (emphasis in original). 
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the FMLA” and recognized this as a major challenge to DOL’s 
implementation of the FFCRA.139 
iii. The DOL’s September 2020 Rule Revision in Response to the 
S.D.N.Y. Decision 
Following the S.D.N.Y. decision, the DOL had a range of legal 
options, from compliance to obstruction.140  Toward the latter end of 
the spectrum, the agency could have tried to render the decision moot 
by appealing to the Second Circuit, which could have stayed the 
district court ruling until it heard the appeal.141  By running the clock 
in this manner, the DOL could have ensured its April Rule would 
remain in effect nearly until the FFCRA was originally set to expire, 
at the end of 2020.142 
Instead, the DOL complied with the decision, revising the Rule on 
September 16, 2020 to correct the overly broad health care provider 
exception.143  The DOL explained that it opted to revise the definition 
in a new emergency rule:  
Given the statutory authorization to invoke exemptions from the 
usual requirements to engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking 
and to delay a rule’s effective date, the time-limited nature of the 
FFCRA leave benefits, the urgency of the COVID-19 pandemic and 
the associated need for FFCRA leave, and the pressing need for 
clarity in light of the District Court’s decision.144   
The new definition of “health care provider” followed the FMLA 
definition, and included any other employee “capable of providing 
health care services, meaning he or she is employed to provide 
diagnostic services, preventive services, treatment services, or other 
services that are integrated with and necessary to the provision of 
patient care and, if not provided, would adversely impact patient 
 
 139. U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 14, at 7. 
 140. See id. at 9 (noting that the DOL reviewed its legal options following the 
S.D.N.Y. decision). 
 141. See Kacie Candela, Federal Family and Sick Leave for Covid-19 Expanded by 
New York District Court, BERKE-WEISS L. PLLC (Aug. 13, 2020), 
https://www.berkeweisslaw.com/blog/2020/8/13/federal-family-and-sick-leave-for-
covid-19-expanded-by-new-york-district-court [https://perma.cc/Z4RE-9H8B]. 
 142. Families First Coronavirus Response Act, Pub. L. No. 116-127, §§ 3102(a)(1), 
5109, 134 Stat. 178, 189, 198 (2020). 
 143. Paid Leave Under the Families First Coronavirus Response Act, 85 Fed. Reg. 
57,677 (Sept. 16, 2020) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 826). 
 144. Id. at 57,678 (citations omitted). 
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care.”145  Finally, six months into the pandemic, those whom Congress 
intended to cover could access emergency paid leave. 
II. THE GOOD CAUSE EXCEPTION: THE DEBATE, ALTERNATIVES, 
AND REFORM PROPOSALS 
The decision to invoke the good cause exception usually lies with 
the agency.  Therefore, reviewing courts have developed case law 
addressing two key questions: (1) under what circumstances agencies 
should invoke the good cause exception, and (2) which standard 
courts should use to review this choice.146  However, because 
Congress statutorily authorized the DOL to use the good cause 
exception to implement the FFCRA, it barred parties and courts from 
asking whether the COVID-19 pandemic justified the DOL’s 
bypassing notice and comment rulemaking — though few 
commentators would disagree that it did.147  Instead, statutory 
authorization charts a new line of inquiry: whether eliminating these 
first order questions without establishing additional procedural 
safeguards unduly risks abuse of agency discretion. 
A. The Cases For and Against Using the Good Cause Exception 
There are two main perspectives on agencies’ use of the good cause 
exception to bypass notice and comment rulemaking: one views the 
good cause exception as a crucial mechanism for agency flexibility 
when situations demand quick action, and the other is concerned 
about the loss of democratic accountability and possible increased 
risk of error.148  Both perspectives are crucial to understanding the 
benefits and costs of Congress’s decision to statutorily authorize the 
DOL to use the good cause exception to implement the FFCRA. 
i. The Good Cause Exception Promotes Agency Flexibility and 
Enabled the DOL to Implement the FFCRA Quickly 
One perspective on the good cause exception recognizes that the 
limitations of notice and comment rulemaking –– particularly the slow 
speed and high cost –– outweigh its benefits in emergency situations, 
during which agencies need to act quickly.  While the good cause 
exception has legitimate non-emergency uses, the key justification for 
 
 145. Id. at 57,690 (quoting Families First Coronavirus Response Act § 
826.30(c)(1)(B)). 
 146. See generally Hartnett, supra note 24. 
 147. See id. at 1576; see also supra Sections I.B.iv, I.C.ii. 
 148. See infra Sections II.A.i–ii. 
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its existence is that “the time necessary to solicit and evaluate public 
comments may foreclose government’s ability to react swiftly,” 
especially to “fast-moving events.”149 
Supporters of the good cause exception also note that it would be 
very difficult for Congress to write a “comprehensive and prescriptive 
statutory definition” limiting its use in such a way that achieves the 
desired effect across all agencies.150  Therefore, Congress should “rely 
more extensively on agency-specific requirements than on generally 
applicable requirements like the APA.”151  However, the FFCRA 
demonstrates that Congress is willing to and can speak directly on 
which rulemaking procedures shall be used to implement an 
emergency statute, despite going no further than authorizing the 
DOL to bypass notice and comment. 
In practice, Congress’s willingness to authorize the use of the good 
cause exception allowed the DOL to act even more quickly and with 
more flexibility than if Congress had left the DOL to invoke the good 
cause exception itself or set a deadline for the DOL to promulgate a 
rule.  Agencies risk litigation by invoking the good cause exception 
without further statutory authorization: one scholar found that from 
1995 to 2012, agencies prevailed in their decision to invoke the APA’s 
good cause exception in 67% of cases.152  Sometimes agencies point to 
tight congressional deadlines to justify the invocation of the good 
cause exception, with mixed results.153  In the late 1970s, Congress put 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) on a strict timetable to 
promulgate rules about air quality standards.154  After missing the 
deadline by one month, the EPA issued a final rule without notice 
and comment, effective immediately, and invoked the good cause 
exception on the grounds that Congress’s deadline rendered notice 
and comment impracticable.155  The EPA then sought post-
promulgation comments for 60 days and changed the rule in response 
to comments received.156  Still, by one author’s estimation, the EPA 
 
 149. Ellen R. Jordan, The Administrative Procedure Act’s “Good Cause” 
Exemption, 36 ADMIN. L. REV. 113, 115–18 (1984); see also United States v. 
Valverde, 628 F. 3d 1159, 1165 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The good cause exception is 
essentially an emergency procedure.” (quoting Buschmann v. Schweiker, 676 F.2d 
352, 357 (9th Cir. 1982))). 
 150. Raso, supra note 25, at 121–22. 
 151. Id. at 124. 
 152. See id. at 90. 
 153. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-21, supra note 59, at 20–21. 
 154. See Jordan, supra note 149, at 125–26. 
 155. See id. 
 156. See id. at 126–27. 
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faced at least 42 challenges in ten circuits to its invocation of the good 
cause exception, and courts in five circuits sustained these 
challenges.157  While this example is distinguishable from the 
monumental national emergency the FFCRA aimed to address, it 
demonstrates the potential cascade of litigation Congress shielded the 
DOL from by not setting a deadline and instead statutorily 
authorizing rule promulgation without notice and comment. 
The argument for agency flexibility and swift action is supported by 
studies showing that, simply, the FFCRA worked.  Despite the DOL’s 
initial underinclusive implementation, recent empirical evidence 
shows that the FFCRA was effective at encouraging sick people to 
stay home, thus slowing the spread of COVID-19.  One study 
analyzing cell phone data found that the FFCRA increased the 
average number of hours at home, thereby reducing the share of 
individuals likely at work.158  Another study found that in states 
where employees gained access to paid sick leave through the 
FFCRA — because these states lacked state-level paid sick leave — 
there were 400 fewer confirmed cases per state per day and that 
therefore it did help “flatten the curve.”159  However, this study notes 
that the benefit might have been limited to the short term because 
employees who took their finite leave as a precaution were unable to 
access it later in the pandemic, forcing them to work while sick and 
potentially spread the virus.160 
ii. The Good Cause Exception Undermines Democratic Participation 
and Agency Accountability and Deprived the DOL of             
Valuable Information 
The other major view of agency decision making sees bypassing 
notice and comment as undermining important rule of law values, 
such as “promoting public deliberation in the rulemaking process, 
guarding against agency arbitrariness, making agencies accountable 
both to the public and to Congress, and providing valuable 
 
 157. See id. at 126–28. 
 158. See Martin Andersen et al., Paid Sick-Leave and Physical Mobility: Evidence 
from the United States During a Pandemic (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working 
Paper No. 27138, 2020). 
 159. See Stefan Pichler, Katherine Wen & Nicolas R. Ziebarth, COVID-19 
Emergency Sick Leave Has Helped Flatten the Curve in the United States, 39 
HEALTH AFFS. 2197, 2202 (2020). 
 160. See id. at 2203 (noting that in times of economic hardship, when employees 
are afraid of losing their jobs, employees who already exhausted their finite leave are 
at a heightened risk of choosing to work sick and potentially spread the COVID-19 
virus). 
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information.”161  It is widely recognized that notice and comment 
rulemaking helps to “reconcile agencies’ democratic deficit with their 
immense power,”162 legitimizing government bodies whose decision 
making power was delegated by Congress and not derived directly 
from the electorate.163 
Notice and comment rulemaking also has important practical 
benefits, such as promoting “accurate, well-informed decisionmaking 
and participant satisfaction with the way government operates.”164  
The agency benefits by receiving information from interested parties 
that aid it in sensible rulemaking, and the public benefits from the 
opportunity to have a direct say in the regulations that will affect 
them.165  Had the DOL engaged in a post-promulgation comment 
period for the FFCRA, it would have gathered information that could 
have helped it make better decisions about how best to allocate its 
funding for enforcement and outreach.  A report by the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics shows that the pandemic caused about 14% of 
businesses to increase the amount of paid sick leave they offer their 
employees since the beginning of 2020.166  While it is possible that the 
FFCRA helped normalize paid sick leave, it may also be the case that 
employers began offering paid sick leave because they did not know 
they could receive a tax credit for doing so through the statute. 
The DOL OIG conducted an investigation in August 2020 and 
found the agency enforcement and outreach efforts to be directionless 
and lacking.167  For example, the DOL’s Wage and Hour Division had 
established a workgroup to oversee FFCRA-related education and 
outreach efforts comprised of experts in policy, compliance, 
communications, enforcement, training, and data analytics.168  
However, the OIG investigation found that the DOL lacked a 
 
 161. Raso, supra note 25, at 67. 
 162. Bagley, supra note 74, at 260. 
 163. See Jordan, supra note 149, at 116–17; see also Michael Asimow, Interim-
Final Rules: Making Haste Slowly, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 703, 708 (1999). 
 164. Jordan, supra note 149, at 115. 
 165. See id. at 116. 
 166. There was a rough correlation between offering paid sick leave and 
government shutdown orders: utilities, which almost never closed, led the pack, 
whereas arts and educational institutions suffered widespread shutdowns and were 
the least likely to have expanded paid sick leave. See Tim Ryan, Pandemic Led 14% 
of Biz Locations to Boost Paid Sick Leave, LAW360 (Dec. 8, 2020, 3:49 PM), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1335296/pandemic-led-14-of-biz-locations-to-boost-
paid-sick-leave [https://perma.cc/JF7T-MVPC]. 
 167. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 14, at 10–11. 
 168. See id. at 10. 
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strategy for this working group’s efforts.169  It further found that the 
DOL had no concrete plans to spend the $2.5 million Congress 
allocated it in the June 2020 CARES Act for enforcement and 
outreach to educate employers and employees about the FFCRA.170  
Notice and comment would have given the public the opportunity to 
communicate directly with the DOL on the FFCRA’s implementation 
and would have given the agency access to valuable information early 
in the pandemic. 
Notice and comment is also instrumental in promoting 
congressional control over the administrative state; it enables 
Congress to gather information, require that agencies examine certain 
issues, and determine how certain constituents will be affected by 
regulations.171  When agencies invoke the good cause exception, 
Congress loses these tools and must rely on other mechanisms of 
control, such as oversight hearings, audit and document requests, 
commissioning GAO investigations, and writing letters to agency 
heads — the last of which was often used following the DOL’s 
implementation of the FFCRA.172  However, these tools are 
hampered by limited resources, hyper-polarization, and shifting 
congressional attention and priorities from election to election.173  
Therefore, when agencies invoke the APA’s good cause exception in 
its current form, the judiciary is “the only entity that has exercised 
meaningful (albeit imperfect) oversight over agency avoidance of 
procedural requirements”, though often with slow and unpredictable 
results.174  This is also the case when Congress has statutorily 
authorized the use of the good cause exception, as in the FFCRA, but 
the agency invites a court challenge by promulgating a rule that 
blatantly contravenes the statute. 
A major critique of the good cause exception, particularly in 
emergency situations, is that it increases the risk of error.  “[S]ome 
rules promulgated under the good cause exemption have been based 
on faulty or inadequate information and have produced unanticipated 
and undesirable effects.  Public participation probably would have led 
 
 169. See id. at 10–11. 
 170. See id.; see also Letter from U.S. Reps. Jimmy Gomez, Rosa DeLauro & 
Carolyn Maloney to Eugene Scalia, Sec’y of Lab., U.S. Dep’t of Lab. (Oct. 2, 2020) 
[hereinafter Gomez, DeLauro & Maloney Letter]. 
 171. See Raso, supra note 25, at 118–19. 
 172. See id. at 120–21; see also Murray & DeLauro Letter, supra note 130. 
 173. See Raso, supra note 25, at 120–21. 
 174. Id. at 119. 
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to better decisions in these cases,”175 and would have increased public 
perception of fairness and acceptance of the rule.  One generous view 
of the April Rule’s erroneously broad definition of a “health care 
provider” is that it was such an error.  While it is not clear that the 
effect of the April Rule — excluding many more U.S. workers from 
emergency paid leave than Congress intended –– was sincerely 
unanticipated or undesirable to then-Secretary Eugene Scalia’s DOL, 
a post-promulgation comment period may have prompted the agency 
to revise the rule much sooner than the New York Attorney 
General’s lawsuit ultimately did.176 
Regardless of whether the April Rule was intentionally overbroad, 
the OIG investigation found that while the DOL acted quickly, it 
continued to face challenges implementing and enforcing the 
FFCRA.177  Most significantly, the report found that the April Rule’s 
broader definition for health care providers presented a “major 
challenge” to ensuring that “all those who are eligible for FFCRA’s 
emergency paid leave benefits [were] able to take advantage of those 
benefits.”178  The OIG did not attempt to estimate how many millions 
of U.S. workers were erroneously denied leave under the April Rule, 
finding only that the estimate of 9 million might be “understated 
because it didn’t include all of the occupations in the Department’s 
expanded definition for health care provider.”179  The DOL’s ability 
to conduct on-site investigations and enforce compliance with the 
FFCRA was also hampered by social distancing efforts and the 
agency’s remote work policy.180 
B. Good Cause Exception and Reform Proposals and Alternatives 
To alleviate the democracy deficit caused by bypassing notice and 
comment, various alternatives to the federal good cause exception 
have been proposed or are already in effect in other contexts. 
Scholars have proposed specific reforms to the federal APA’s good 
cause exception, such as mandatory post-promulgation comments and 
 
 175. James Yates, “Good Cause” Is Cause for Concern, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1438, 1451 (2018). 
 176. See infra Sections II.B.i–iii. 
 177. See U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 14, at 2. 
 178. See id. 
 179. See id. at 2–3, 9. 
 180. See id. at 4–6 (explaining that, instead of on-site investigations, all but the 
most serious complaints were being investigated remotely, which limits efficiency, or 
being resolved through conciliation). 
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expiration dates.181  There are also emergency rulemaking 
alternatives in use –– with varying degrees of success –– at the federal 
and state levels, such as the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA) Emergency Temporary Standards and state 
APAs.182  This Note will examine the emergency rulemaking 
procedures proposed by scholars, used by OSHA, and set out in the 
Model State APA and New York’s and Virginia’s APAs.183 
i. Proposals to Reform the Federal APA’s Good Cause Exception 
Legal scholars, particularly those who are concerned about the 
good cause exception’s democracy deficit, have been proposing 
reforms for decades.184  One longtime proposal is to require a 
comment period after an emergency rule is promulgated.185  
However, one drawback of this model is that the comment period “is 
often considered a waste of time by the public, which views the 
agency as having made its decision.”186  Additionally, both the agency 
and regulated parties may become biased in favor of the emergency 
rule.187  At an institutional level, “[t]here are significant risks to our 
democratic system where agencies are given a second shot at 
explaining away” notice and comment after the rule has been 
promulgated.188 
One way to overcome the weaknesses of a post-promulgation 
comment period is by placing an automatic expiration date on 
emergency rules.189  This would limit agencies’ ability to use 
emergency rules as permanent solutions and would “make any post-
 
 181. See infra Section II.B.i. 
 182. See infra Sections II.B.i–iii. 
 183. See infra Section II.B.iii. 
 184. See supra Section II.A.ii; see also Nathanael Paynter, Comment, Flexibility 
and Public Participation: Refining the Administrative Procedure Act’s Good Cause 
Exception, 2011 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 397, 399 (2011) (“[I]n order to limit the power 
given to agencies acting in a quasi-legislative capacity, and to protect basic principles 
of representative democracy in rulemaking, changes to the good cause exception are 
necessary.”); James Kim, Note, For a Good Cause: Reforming the Good Cause 
Exception to Notice and Comment Rulemaking Under the Administrative Procedure 
Act, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1045, 1070–71 (2011). 
 185. See Jordan, supra note 149, at 116, 168. 
 186. Id. at 171. 
 187. See Yates, supra note 175, at 1452. 
 188. Id. at 1452, 1461 (arguing that because of these risks, major rules, which are 
rules that have at least $10 million in consequences, should have to undergo pre-
promulgation notice and comment, with a notable exception for rules that address 
“an immediate emergency or risk of emergency to public health, safety, or welfare”). 
 189. See Jordan, supra note 149, at 171. 
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promulgation comment period more productive, since the agency will 
have to take further action to review and reissue a final rule for 
congressional approval.”190  However, automatic expiration dates may 
hurt compliance with the emergency rule; regulated entities will be on 
notice that rules may change or disappear, and therefore will be less 
likely to voluntarily incur the often high costs associated with 
compliance.191  How well firms comply with temporary rules may also 
influence whether and how much the agency changes the rule 
following the comment period.192 
Some scholars have proposed more limited reforms of the good 
cause exception.  Because generalization beyond what already exists 
in the APA would be difficult, Congress could consider creating 
agency-specific procedural requirements.193  Another proposal is to 
make the good cause exception unavailable for major rules: those 
with an economic impact of over $100 million must undergo pre-
promulgation notice and comment.194 
ii. OSHA Emergency Temporary Standards 
Mandatory expiration dates on emergency regulations 
promulgated without notice and comment is not a novel proposal, 
though it has hit some stumbling blocks at the federal level in the 
workplace context.  Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 
1970,195 OSHA has the ability to either promulgate a rule using a 
variation of traditional notice and comment under Section 6(b)196 or 
issue an Emergency Temporary Standard (ETS) under Section 
6(c).197  The ETS provision empowers OSHA to bypass notice and 
 
 190. Id. at 172. 
 191. See id. at 173–74. 
 192. See id. at 174. 
 193. See Raso, supra note 25, at 73. 
 194. See Yates, supra note 175, at 1445. 
 195. See generally Pub. L. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590. See also 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–78. 
 196. See 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(2). 
 197. See id. § 655(c). 
The Secretary shall provide, without regard to the requirements of chapter 
5, title 5, Unites States Code, for an emergency temporary standard to take 
immediate effect upon publication in the Federal Register if he determines 
–– (A) that employees are exposed to grave danger from exposure to 
substances or agents determined to be toxic or physically harmful or from 
new hazards, and (B) that such emergency standard is necessary to protect 
employees from such danger. (2) Such standard shall be effective until 
superseded by a standard promulgated in accordance with the procedures 
prescribed in paragraph (3) of this subsection. (3) Upon publication of such 
standard in the Federal Register the Secretary shall commence a proceeding 
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comment if the Secretary determines that employees “are exposed to 
a grave danger” from exposure to harmful substances, and an ETS is 
“necessary to protect employees from such danger.”198  Unlike under 
the good cause exception, once an ETS is published, it also serves as 
notice for a mandatory post-promulgation comment period.199  The 
ETS remains in effect for six months or until a permanent rule 
promulgated using notice and comment supersedes it, whichever 
comes first.200 
OSHA has only issued 11 ETSs since its creation in 1970 and has 
only issued two ETS since courts struck down its 1983 ETS on 
asbestos.201  Of the first nine issued, only three were unchallenged in 
court.202  Of the six that were, four were fully vacated or stayed, and 
one was partially vacated.203  Only one challenged ETS survived.204 
Of the five cases that were not challenged or that were fully or 
partially upheld by the courts, OSHA issued a permanent standard 
either within the six months required by the statute or within several 
months of the six-month period and always within one year of the 
promulgation of the ETS.205   
However, after 1980, a combination of court decisions and new 
federal laws put additional requirements on OSHA’s rulemaking 
procedure that helped disincentivize the use of ETSs.206 
Some members of Congress, groups in health care and meat 
processing, and workers had hoped OSHA would promulgate an ETS 
to address the COVID-19 pandemic.207  At least nine COVID-19 
 
in accordance with section 6(b) of this Act, and the standard as published 
shall also serve as a proposed rule for the proceeding. The Secretary shall 
promulgate a standard under this paragraph no later than six months after 
publication of the emergency standard as provided in paragraph (2) of this 
subsection. 
Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. See id. 
 200. See id. 
 201. See COVID-19 Vaccination and Testing; Emergency Temporary Standard, 86 
Fed. Reg. 61,551–54 (Nov. 5, 2021); see also SCOTT D. SZYMENDERA, CONG. RSCH. 
SERV., R46288, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION (OSHA): 
EMERGENCY TEMPORARY STANDARDS (ETS) AND COVID-19 6, 27 (2021). 
 202. See id. 
 203. See id. 
 204. See id. 
 205. See id. at 6. 
 206. See id. 
 207. See id.; see also Letter from Members of Cong. to Kevin McCarthy, 
Republican Leader, U.S. House of Reps. (July 14, 2020); Letter from A Better 
Balance et al. to U.S. House of Reps. (Apr. 29, 2020). 
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relief bills in the 116th Congress would have required OSHA to 
promulgate an ETS to address workplace exposure to COVID-19; 
this provision ultimately did not make it into the FFCRA or other 
COVID-19 relief laws.208  These hopes and efforts were realized in 
June 2021, when OSHA issued its first ETS in nearly four decades, 
establishing new requirements to protect healthcare workers who are 
at high risk of exposure to COVID-19.209  In November 2021, OSHA 
issued another COVID-19 ETS, requiring employees with 100 or 
more employees to develop, implement, and enforce a mandatory 
COVID-19 vaccination policy or an optional vaccination policy with 
regular testing and mask-wearing requirements for unvaccinated 
employees.210 
iii. State Emergency Rule Procedures: The 2010 Model State APA, 
New York, and Virginia 
In addition to the federal APA, all 50 states have their own state 
APAs.211  These state APAs can serve as “laboratories of 
democracy,” testing reforms that could be implemented at the federal 
level.212  However, state APA emergency procedures are not perfectly 
analogizable to the federal APA because state agencies face different 
emergencies than federal agencies, such as complying with deadlines 
for federal funding.213 
 
 208. See SZYMENDERA, supra note 201. 
 209. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910.502, 1910.504–05, 1910.509 (2021); see also Press Release, 
U.S. Dep’t of Lab., US Department of Labor’s OSHA Issues Emergency Temporary 
Standard to Protect Healthcare Workers from the Coronavirus (June 10, 2021), 
https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/osha/osha20210610-0 
[https://perma.cc/4ZYA-8R83]. 
 210. See COVID-19 Vaccination and Testing; Emergency Temporary Standard, 85 
Fed. Reg. 61,402, 61,402, 61,551–54 (Nov. 5, 2021). 
 211. State Administrative Procedure Acts, BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/State_administrative_procedure_acts [https://perma.cc/KR7X-
U66D] (last visited Apr. 15, 2021). 
 212. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) (“[A] single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a 
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of 
the country.”). 
 213. See, e.g., REVISED MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROC. ACT § 309 (NAT’L CONF. OF 
COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE L. 2010) (permitting the invocation of emergency 
rulemaking to prevent “the loss of federal funding for an agency program”); see also 
VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-4011(B) (2021) (allowing emergency rulemaking when a 
federal regulation requires compliance within 280 days or less from its enactment). 
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The non-partisan Uniform Law Commission routinely publishes a 
Model State APA, most recently in 2010.214  No state has yet enacted 
the 2010 Model State APA.215  The 2010 Model State APA’s Section 
309 provides that an agency may bypass full notice and comment if it 
finds that “an imminent peril to the public health, safety, or welfare 
or the loss of federal funding for an agency program requires the 
immediate adoption of an emergency rule.”216  The agency must 
publish its reasons for such a finding.217  Unlike the federal good 
cause exception, Section 309 mandates an expiration date for 
emergency rules: 180 days, with the option for a 180-day renewal.218  
Adopting an emergency rule does not preclude notice and comment 
rulemaking; nor does it prohibit the adoption of a new emergency 
rule if “the agency finds that the imminent peril to the public health, 
safety, or welfare or the loss of federal funding for an agency program 
still exists” when the original emergency rule expires.219 
Section 309 was adapted from the 1961 Model State APA and 
Virginia’s State APA.220  New York State’s emergency rulemaking 
provision is based on the 1961 Model State APA; the former provides 
for emergency rule expiration after 90 days, with the option to 
readopt the rule for two additional 60-day periods.221  The agency 
may readopt the emergency rule once if it has submitted a notice of 
proposed rulemaking and may readopt a second time if it has solicited 
and assessed public comments.222  Emergency rules addressing 
“security authorizations, corporate or financial structures or 
reorganization thereof” may be exempted from the expiration 
requirement “if the agency finds that the purpose of the rule would be 
frustrated if subsequent notice procedures were required.”223  The 
agency is not required to engage in a post-promulgation comment 
period; however, it must provide notice about whether it intends to 
 
 214. See State Administrative Procedure Acts, Revised, UNIF. L. COMM’N, 
https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-
home?communitykey=f184fb0c-5e31-4c6d-8228-7f2b0112fa42&tab=groupdetails (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2021). The states and jurisdictions that have enacted previous Model 
APAs are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Iowa, Kansas, 
Montana, Tennessee, Washington D.C., and Wyoming. Id. 
 215. See id. 
 216. See REVISED MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROC. ACT § 309. 
 217. See id. 
 218. See id. 
 219. See id. 
 220. See id. § 309 cmt. 
 221. See id.; see also N.Y. A.P.A. LAW § 202(6)(b) (Consol. 2021). 
 222. See N.Y. A.P.A. LAW § 202(6)(e). 
 223. Id. § 202(6)(c). 
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engage in full notice and comment, explain the statutory authority 
and reasons for the emergency rule, give the dates the rule will take 
effect and expire, provide a regulatory impact statement and 
flexibility analysis, and provide the contact information of a 
representative who can answer questions about the rule.224 
Virginia’s APA statute also contains an emergency rulemaking 
provision.225  If an agency believes an emergency situation 
necessitates a rule, it must consult with and receive permission from 
the Attorney General before promulgation; the Governor has the 
final say as to whether the rule is truly necessary.226  When a state or 
federal law imposes a deadline of 280 days or less to act, an agency 
may propose an emergency rule without consulting the Attorney 
General, but the Governor must still approve the rule before it takes 
effect.227  Virginia imposes an expiration date on all emergency rules, 
albeit a long one: 18 months.228  The agency may issue related 
emergency rules within this period, but the clock starts with the first 
emergency rule.229  As in New York, the agency must decide 
relatively quickly whether it will want to make the emergency rule 
permanent; it must publish a notice within 60 days of the emergency 
regulation’s effective date, and propose a replacement regulation 
within 180 days of the same.230  If the agency tries but fails to adopt a 
replacement rule before the emergency rule expires, the Governor 
may authorize re-adoption of the emergency rule for a period no 
longer than six months.231  The decision to readopt the emergency 
rule is not subject to judicial review.232 
The Model State APA, New York, and Virginia good cause 
provisions offer a variety of alternatives that could be incorporated at 
the federal level in emergency and/or agency-specific legislation, 
despite the fact that they were designed with the additional purpose 
of complying with deadlines imposed by federal regulations and for 
federal funding.233  Most importantly, they demonstrate that 
procedural safeguards such as a mandatory post-promulgation 
 
 224. See id. § 202(6)(d). 
 225. See generally VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-4011 (2021). 
 226. See id. § 2.2-4011(A). 
 227. See id. § 2.2-4011(B). 
 228. See id. § 2.2-4011(C). 
 229. See id. 
 230. See id. 
 231. See id. § 2.2-4011(D). 
 232. See id. 
 233. See supra text accompanying note 213. 
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comment period and expiration dates with the limited possibility of 
extension can work in practice. 
III. A PROCEDURAL FRAMEWORK FOR EMERGENCY 
RULEMAKING WHEN THE GOOD CAUSE EXCEPTION IS 
STATUTORILY AUTHORIZED 
This Note proposes a series of procedural safeguards when 
Congress statutorily authorizes agencies to bypass notice and 
comment rulemaking in future emergencies based on lessons learned 
from the DOL’s initial erroneous implementation of the FFCRA.  
First, Congress should continue to regard statutory authorization as 
an effective legislative tool because it succeeded in shielding the DOL 
from judicial review of what was truly an “emergency,” which has had 
a severe chilling effect on OSHA’s use of ETSs.234  However, 
statutory authorization should only be used in true emergencies: 
situations in which the depth and breadth of the harm a delay in 
rulemaking would cause substantially outweigh the harm of bypassing 
notice and comment.235  Congress has already effectuated this 
principle in the context of public health emergencies,236 national 
security,237 and disaster relief programs.238  This should be Congress’s 
guiding principle when crafting future emergency legislation. 
When Congress is faced with another true emergency justifying 
statutory authorization to bypass traditional notice and comment, it 
should mandate a set of procedures that help restore some of the 
democratic process that is lost.239  The first procedural safeguard 
should be that the emergency rule automatically serves as notice of 
proposed rulemaking,240 just as OSHA’s ETSs do.241  Beginning on 
the effective date of the emergency rule, the agency should be 
required to engage in a 30-day comment period, even if the agency 
does not intend to make the emergency rule permanent or is unsure 
whether it will do so.  A 30-day comment period is the ideal length for 
an emergency rule because it is only slightly less than the mean and 
 
 234. See SZYMENDERA, supra note 201, at 6, 22. 
 235. See Jordan, supra note 149, at 115, 118. 
 236. See Families First Coronavirus Response Act, Pub. L. No. 116-127, § 5111, 134 
Stat. 178, 201 (2020) (emphasis added). 
 237. See supra text accompanying notes 69–70. 
 238. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-21, supra note 59, at 47–48, 
55. 
 239. See Bagley, supra note 74, at 260. 
 240. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b)(1)–(3) for what NPRM typically requires. 
 241. See 29 U.S.C. § 655(c). 
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median comment periods agencies use for non-emergency rules, 39 
and 32 days, respectively.242 
One critique of this approach is that it is a waste of agency 
resources to mandate post-promulgation notice and comment if the 
agency intends to let the emergency rule expire, particularly when the 
emergency requiring the rule passes quickly.243  Further, if interested 
members of the public believe the agency plans to let the rule expire, 
they may be disincentivized from commenting because they assume 
doing so would be pointless.244  However, even if an emergency rule 
will expire, post-promulgation notice and comment serves three other 
essential purposes: it (1) helps the agency gather information quickly 
and develop expertise about an emergency, which by definition is a 
situation where information is scarce and in high demand;245 (2) 
addresses the democracy deficit by giving the public a non-judiciary 
avenue to criticize an agency’s implementation of an emergency 
law;246 and (3) could prompt the agency to beneficially revise the 
emergency rule before it expires.247 
Congress should also mandate that the emergency rule expire 90 
days after the rule becomes effective, unless the agency promulgates a 
permanent rule based on comments received during the first 30-day 
period.248  This would leave the agency 60 days to review comments 
and either promulgate a revised permanent rule or decide to let the 
emergency rule expire; either way, the agency should be required to 
explain its choice in a concise general statement when the new rule is 
promulgated, or the emergency rule expires, whichever comes first.249  
The new permanent rule would be subject to judicial review under the 
 
 242. See Balla, supra note 45, at 5. 
 243. See ADMIN. CONF. OF THE U.S., supra note 61. 
 244. See Jordan, supra note 149, at 171. 
 245. See Raso, supra note 25, at 118–19; see also Emergency, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/emergency [https://perma.cc/P38R-
LN2F] (last visited May 31, 2021) (defining emergency as “an unforeseen 
combination of circumstances or the resulting state that calls for immediate action”). 
 246. See Bagley, supra note 74, at 260; see also Raso, supra note 25, at 118–19. 
 247. The DOL revised its implementation of the FFCRA three times before the 
law’s mandatory provision expired on December 31, 2020. See Paid Leave Under the 
Families First Coronavirus Response Act, 85 Fed. Reg. 20,156 (Apr. 10, 2020); see 
also Paid Leave Under the Families First Coronavirus Response Act, 85 Fed. Reg. 
57,677 (Sept. 16, 2020); Paid Leave Under the Families First Coronavirus Response 
Act, 85 Fed. Reg. 19,326 (Apr. 6, 2020).  
 248. See Appendix A (showing examples of expiration dates for emergency rules 
at the federal and state levels); see also Jordan, supra note 149, at 171. 
 249. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c); see also United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. 
Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 252–53 (2d. Cir. 1977). 
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“logical outgrowth” standard, like any other rule.250  However, 
because the use of statutory authorization implies that Congress 
believes having a quickly-assembled emergency rule is better than 
having no rule at all, it is imperative that courts ruling against the 
agency on the new permanent rule employ the equitable remedy of 
remand without vacatur, which allows the rule to stay in effect while 
the agency reconsiders it.251 
Congress should allow for one 30-day extension on the expiration 
date of the emergency rule if the agency is still reviewing comments 
or a permanent rule is pending.  The 2010 Model State APA, New 
York, and Virginia all allow emergency rule extensions, and New 
York’s opportunity for a second extension is premised on whether 
comments are solicited and assessed.252  The use of the extension 
should not preclude the agency from allowing the rule to expire or 
issuing a new permanent rule, but the proposed concise general 
statement requirement should still apply.  Congress should insulate 
the agency’s decision to use the 30-day extension from judicial review, 
as Virginia does.253  While doing so removes any incentive for the 
agency not to use the extension, judicial review of such a short 
extension would undermine agency flexibility and would likely be 
moot by the time a court ruled.254  Further, given that 60 days –– the 
length of the proposed period between the end of the mandatory 
comment period and the expiration of the emergency rule –– is a 
relatively brief amount of time to promulgate a permanent rule, 
agencies deserve some flexibility to take a little more time to ensure 
that the permanent rule is not written hastily or plagued by the same 
missteps as the initial emergency rule.255 
Congress should also statutorily authorize the agency to revise the 
emergency rule without notice and comment as often as needed 
during the 90 to 120-day period the rule is in effect.  As with the 
extension, this will give the agency the flexibility it needs –– and 
needed twice during the FFCRA –– to correct errors in rushed 
 
 250. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3); see also Veterans Just. Grp., LLC v. Sec’y of 
Veterans Affs., 818 F.3d 1336, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 251. See ADMIN. CONF. OF THE U.S., RECOMMENDATION 2013-6, REMAND 
WITHOUT VACATUR (2013). 
 252. See Appendix A; see also REVISED MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROC. ACT § 309 
(NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2010); N.Y. A.P.A. LAW § 
202(6)(e) (Consol. 2021); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-4011(D) (2021). 
 253. See VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-4011(D) (2021). 
 254. See Jordan, supra note 149, at 115, 118 (recognizing that agency flexibility is 
crucial in an emergency). 
 255. See Yates, supra note 175, at 1451. 
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rules.256  Virginia similarly allows additional emergency regulations as 
needed addressing the subject matter of the initial emergency 
regulation.257  However, as Virginia does, Congress should clarify that 
revisions do not affect the effective date for the comment period, 
expiration date, and extension.258  When Congress statutorily 
authorized the DOL to implement the FFCRA, it gave the DOL the 
authority “to issue regulations for good cause.”259  The DOL –– 
reasonably, given the plural “regulations” –– justified its September 
2020 revisions by invoking this statutory authorization to bypass 
notice and comment rulemaking.260  However, Congress should be 
even more explicit in future emergency legislation that revisions are 
permitted, especially if it also imposes deadlines for post-
promulgation notice and comment procedures, as are recommended 
here. 
Revisions during the 90 to 120-day emergency rule period present 
notice and logical outgrowth issues for a new permanent rule the 
agency may promulgate. With a 30-day comment period beginning on 
the emergency rule’s effective date, the public will have neither a 
meaningful opportunity to comment on any revisions made toward 
the end of this period nor any opportunity to comment on revisions 
made after.261  However, this is not a cause for concern.  Agencies 
have good faith reasons to revise an emergency rule after the 
comment period but before allowing it to expire or promulgating a 
new permanent rule: to correct an error or address an urgent issue 
brought to the agency’s attention during the comment period.262  
Further, under this proposal, emergency rule revisions would be 
subject to the mandatory expiration date.263  Finally, the public will 
have the opportunity to comment on the subject matter of the 
emergency rule during the 30-day comment period, which allows for 
more participation than presently exists. 
A valid critique of this proposal is that the deadlines for the 
comment period, rule expiration, and extension are all shorter than 
 
 256. See id. 
 257. See VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-4011(C) (2021). 
 258. See id. 
 259. Families First Coronavirus Response Act, Pub. L. No. 116-127, § 5111, 134 
Stat. 178, 201 (2020). 
 260. Paid Leave Under the Families First Coronavirus Response Act, 85 Fed. Reg. 
57,677 (Sept. 16, 2020). 
 261. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c). See generally United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. 
Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 252–53 (2d. Cir. 1977). 
 262. See Yates, supra note 175, at 1451. 
 263. See Jordan, supra note 149, at 172. 
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the analogous deadlines in use at the federal and state levels.264  Such 
a strict timeline undermines the critical flexibility that emergency rule 
mechanisms are meant to enable.265  However, such a short timeline is 
necessary because it would ensure agency accountability faster and 
more effectively than judicial review, which is unpredictable and, as 
demonstrated by the FFCRA litigation, can take at least six 
months.266  Finally, this framework would not undermine the good 
cause exception generally because this Note only proposes that the 
framework be included in emergency legislation statutorily 
authorizing an agency to bypass traditional notice and comment.  
Emergencies demand not only swift rules but effective ones.  This 
framework would avoid what happened with the FFCRA by 
preserving agency flexibility during emergencies while ensuring that 
the interested public and Congress have the opportunity to formally 
engage with the substance of emergency rules.267 
These additional procedures would have been effective at ensuring 
that the DOL’s implementation of the FFCRA was consistent with 
the statute and would have had positive externalities as well.  A post-
promulgation comment period would have prompted the DOL to 
gather information from Congress and interested parties such as trade 
associations, workers’ rights groups, unions, business groups, and 
health care providers about early stumbling blocks to accessing and 
providing leave under the FFCRA, as well as from lawyers scrambling 
to advise employees of their rights and employers of their 
obligations.268  This information could have caused the DOL to fix the 
April Rule’s overly broad health care provider exception at least two 
months earlier, in response to comments received when promulgating 
a permanent rule following the emergency rule’s expiration after 90 
to 120 days.269  Further, given the unprecedented and changing nature 
of the COVID-19 pandemic, this information could have given the 
DOL a better sense of how best to spend its $2.5 million on outreach 
and enforcement and closed at least part of the information gap 
caused by remote investigations.270  In short, these procedural 
safeguards could have made the FFCRA even more effective and 
 
 264. See Appendix A. 
 265. See Jordan, supra note 149, at 115, 118. 
 266. See supra Section I.C. 
 267. See supra Section I.C. 
 268. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 14. 
 269. See supra Sections I.C.iii, II.B. 
 270. See U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 14, at 10–11; see 
also Gomez, DeLauro & Maloney Letter, supra note 170. 
106 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLIX 
accessible to U.S. workers during the pandemic, potentially saving 
lives. 
CONCLUSION 
The COVID-19 pandemic will eventually end, but future 
emergencies will again necessitate agency flexibility and immediately 
effective regulations.  The story of the FFCRA shows the real risk 
that agencies may misuse the ability to promulgate rules without 
notice and comment when they are insulated from judicial review of 
the decision to do so; agencies may exceed the scope of their 
authority, and the concerns of Congress, interested parties, and the 
public may go unsolicited and ignored.  As the implementation of the 
FFCRA demonstrates, the stakes — for democracy and human life –– 
are high.  Therefore, Congress should not confer statutory 
authorization to bypass notice and comment rulemaking lightly and 
should require additional procedures to ensure agency accountability 
without sacrificing upfront flexibility.  The solution most likely to 
strike that balance is a mandatory 30-day post-promulgation 
comment period, a 90-day expiration date with the possibility of a 
single 30-day extension unless a permanent rule is promulgated, and 
the ability to revise the emergency rule without notice and comment 
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APPENDIX A 
Figure 1: Emergency Rulemaking Alternatives to the Good Cause 
Exception 
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